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Divided Executives and Democratisation 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the effect of a divided executive on 
democratisation in mixed systems where presidents are directly 
elected and prime ministers are responsible to the legislature. A 
divided executive is where the president and prime minister are not 
from the same party. The importance of a divided executive is 
hypothesised to vary according to the relative powers of the 
president and prime minister. In mixed systems where either the 
president or the prime minister is the dominant actor, then a 
divided executive will not affect democratisation. However, where 
both the president and prime minister have significant independent 
powers, then a divided executive should have a negative impact on 
democratisation because of the potential for destabilising intra-
executive conflict. Using an ordinal logit model, the results show 
that mixed systems with a dual executive do not perform 
significantly worse than mixed systems where there is one 
dominant actor. This suggests that the standard wisdom about the 
impact of a divided executive in a mixed system is misplaced. 
 
Divided Executives and Democratisation 
 
There is a standard and highly intuitive wisdom about the impact of executive-
legislative relations on the process of democratisation. All else equal, the process 
is more likely to be successful when the executive is responsible to a single 
representative authority. This is the basis of the commonly held conviction that 
“parliamentary government should be the general guideline for constitution 
writers in divided societies” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 102). In a parliamentary system, 
the central figure in the executive is the prime minister, who heads a government 
that is collectively responsible to the legislature. By contrast, the process of 
democratisation is less likely to be successful when there are dual lines of 
responsibility. This is the basis of criticisms of presidentialism (Linz, 1994). Here, 
the executive is unified in the form of the directly elected president, but there 
may be conflict between the executive and the legislature when the president 
fails to enjoy majority support in the latter (Stepan & Skach, 1993). This is also the 
basis of criticisms of mixed systems. Here, the executive may be divided between 
a directly elected president and a prime minister who heads a government that is 
collectively responsible to the legislature. When the president and prime minister 
are from different political forces there is the potential for intra-executive conflict 
(Valenzuela, 2004, p. 17). Such conflict may lead to a political stalemate that 
encourages either the military to intervene, or the president to assume 
authoritarian powers as a way of breaking the deadlock. 
In this article, we focus on the impact of a divided executive on the 
process of democratisation in a mixed system of government, i.e. a system where 
there is both a directly elected president and a prime minister who is responsible 
to the legislature. A textbook example of the danger of intra-executive conflict in 
such a system occurred in Niger in 1996. Here, the 1995 parliamentary elections 
returned a majority opposed to the incumbent president, Mahmane Ousmane. 
When the new majority elected a prime minister, Hama Amadou, there was a 
stand-off between the two parts of the exective: “As both president and prime 
minister went ‘on strike’, refusing to carry out duties prescribed by the 
constitution for the normal functioning of the government, a near-total 
breakdown in constitutional procedures resulted” (Villalón and Idrissa, 2005, p. 
38). In January 1996, the military stepped in and Niger’s first experiment with 
democracy came to an end. 
 In our sample of countries with a mixed system of government, we 
hypothesise that a divided executive is more likely to have a negative impact on 
democratisation when it occurs in countries where both the president and the 
prime minister have significant independent political powers than in countries 
where only one actor exercises significant power. We define a divided executive 
as the situation where the president and prime minister are from different 
political forces. To test for the effect of a divided executive on democratisation in 
our sample, we use Freedom House’s classification of countries as Free, Partly 
Free and Not Free. 
 Identifying the effect of a divided executive on democratisation is an 
important research theme. In January 2004, members of the Constitutional Loya 
Jurga approved a new constitution for Afghanistan. As late as September 2003 
the draft constitution had included provision for a mixed system with both a 
directly elected president and a prime minister responsible to the Wolesi Jirga, 
the lower house of the Afghan National Assembly (Rubin, 2004, p. 12). In the 
end, a pure presidential system was recommended. There were political interests 
at stake in the choice of the system (ibid.). However, a key concern about the 
proposed system was the potential for intra-executive conflict. One of the 
participants in the drafting procedure summed up the reasons why 
presidentialism was chosen ahead of a mixed system: “There would be no 
uncertainty about who held executive power in Kabul, and Washington would 
retain the benefit of having a clearly identifiable Afghan partner …” (ibid.). Of 
course, the success or failure of democratisation depends on many factors. All 
the same, there is a consensus that institutional features can make a difference to 
the outcome of the process. Even if Afghanistan finished by rejecting a mixed 
system, many democratically fragile countries have decided to adopt such a 
system. They include Timor-Leste in 2002, the Central African Republic in 2005, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in February 2006. Identifying the 
effect of a divided executive on democratisation in such systems will help to 
determine whether or not they really should be avoided. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section 
identifies the potential for a divided executive in a mixed system where there is a 
directly elected president and a prime minister responsible to the legislature. We 
then outline the standard wisdom that intra-executive conflict has a negative 
impact on the process of democratisation. Having established the hypotheses to 
be tested, we then identify the sample, the variables and the statistical model. We 
then present the results of the model. There is a brief conclusion. 
 
Institutional divisions in parliamentary, presidential and mixed 
systems of government 
 
When drafting a constitution, there are three basic systems of government from 
which to choose. (See Figure 1). Each system has its specific advantages and 
disadvantages. In this article, we focus on the issue of institutional conflict. 
Parliamentary systems provide the least opportunity for institutional divisions. 
Presidential systems provide the opportunity for division between the executive 
and the legislature. Mixed systems provide the potential for division within the 
executive between the president and the prime minister. This situation is the 
basis of a general preference for parliamentarism over presidentialism and the 
reason why mixed systems are rarely recommended. 
 Figure 1 about here 
 In parliamentary systems, there is a single line of political accountability. 
The prime minister is the dominant individual within the executive and the 
prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. In such 
systems, there is no guarantee that the prime minister will enjoy majority 
support in the legislature. Even so, there is little opportunity for prolonged 
institutional conflict. Either the legislature will vote no-confidence in the 
government and the prime minister will be replaced, or it will tolerate the 
government and the prime minister will continue to be the dominant figure 
within the executive.1 In such systems, there may be tensions between the prime 
minister and the head of state – either a monarch or an indirectly elected 
president. However, in democracies these tensions are never regime-threatening. 
The single and direct line of accountability between the government and the 
legislature means that the prime minister’s legitimacy is ultimately 
uncontestable. Unless there is an authoritarian situation, as in Nepal, then 
ongoing intra-executive conflict will not occur in a parliamentary system. 
                                                 
1 Of course, the prime minister’s political power will depend on many factors, 
including the degree of fractionalisation of the legislature. The point being made 
is that the prime minister will not face competition from the president or 
monarch. 
 In presidential systems, there are two lines of political accountability. The 
president is directly elected and acts as both head of state and head of 
government. Therefore, there is no possibility of division within the executive.2 
By contrast, the president and the legislature both serve for a fixed term and so 
are independent of each other. As a result, in cases where the president fails to 
enjoy majority support in the legislature, then there is the opportunity for 
prolonged institutional conflict between the two branches of government as both 
institutions have an indisputable claim to popular legitimacy. Thus, in 
presidential systems the dual lines of accountability create the potential for 
institutional conflict. However, this conflict can only occur between the executive 
and the legislature. 
 In mixed systems, there are also two lines of political accountability. The 
president is directly elected for a fixed term, while the prime minister and 
cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. The system is mixed in that, 
as in parliamentary systems, there is no opportunity for ongoing institutional 
conflict between the prime minister and the legislature. If the legislature 
disapproves of the prime minister, then the government will be voted out of 
office. Thus, the prime minister will always have the support the legislature.3 By 
                                                 
2 There may be division between the president and cabinet ministers, but for the 
purposes of this article we exclude this scenario. 
3 This is true in the sense that a prime minister who is opposed by the legislature 
may always be voted out of office. 
contrast, as in presidential systems, there is the potential for prolonged 
institutional conflict between the president and the legislature because the two 
institutions have equally indisputable claims to popular legitimacy. In contrast to 
presidential systems systems, though, in mixed systems this conflict is found 
within the executive. When it occurs, the source of the conflict lies in the fact that 
the majority in the legislature is opposed to the president, but the manifestation 
of this conflict occurs in the executive between the president and the prime 
minister. Thus, mixed systems are the only systems that provide the potential for 
ongoing conflict within a divided executive. 
 
The problem of a divided executive in a mixed system of 
government 
 
There are problems associated with parliamentary, presidential and mixed 
systems. In parliamentary systems, the single line of accountability can mean that 
there is a rapid turnover of governments in the event that the legislature is highly 
fractionalised. In presidential systems, the zero-sum nature of presidential 
elections may encourage the rise of presidents who feel they have the right to 
dominate the political process by virtue of their direct election. At the same time, 
the dual source of legitimacy in such systems means that presidents may fail to 
enjoy majority support in the legislature, so creating “the possibility of an 
impasse between the chief executive and the legislative body for which there is 
no constitutionally available impasse-breaking device” (Stepan & Skach, 1993, p. 
18). Moreover, the fixed-term nature of both institutions may mean that the 
conflict is protracted, encouraging authoritarian presidents to subvert the rule of 
law and/or leading the military to intervene as a poder moderador (Linz, 1994, p. 
7). In mixed systems, the potential disadvantages are cumulative. As in 
parliamentary systems, the fact that the prime minister is responsible to 
parliament may mean that there is a high turnover of governments if the 
legislature is highly fractionalised. Moreover, as in presidential systems, the fact 
that the president is directly elected may encourage the rise of populist and/or 
authoritarian presidents. Indeed, when the president is supported by a loyal 
parliamentary majority Lijphart argues that mixed systems “actually make it 
possible for the president to be even more powerful that in most pure 
presidential systems” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 102). However, the most commonly cited 
disadvantage of mixed systems is unique to this form of government, namely the 
problem of potentially destabilising conflict caused by an executive “divided 
against itself” (Pierce, 1991). 
 In mixed systems the problem of a divided executive is most pronounced 
when the president is from one party or political grouping and the prime 
minister is from an opposed party or grouping. This situation corresponds to 
French-style cohabitation. There is general agreement that cohabitation is not 
intrinsically problematic. For example, Suleiman (1994) has outlined in great 
detail the reasons why France survived the first potentially destabilising period 
of cohabitation from 1986-88. However, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 286) identify 
the circumstances when the effects of cohabitation may be much less benign: 
When supporters of one or the other component of semi-
presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one 
branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would 
disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and 
suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or 
the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as 
long as the side they favor does not prevail. 
In these circumstances, they argue that “policy conflicts often express themselves 
as a conflict between two branches of democracy” (ibid., p. 287). In this context, 
Stepan and Suleiman (1995) recommend against the export of a French-style 
mixed system to democratising countries. 
 The problem of a divided executive is compounded by the worry that 
intra-executive conflict may not be confined to periods of cohabitation. For Linz, 
mixed systems are inherently problematic: “The result inevitably is a lot of 
politicking and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to 
contradictory policies due to the struggle between the president and prime 
minister” (Linz, 1994, p. 55). In this regard, Linz is particularly concerned about 
the relationship between the executive and the military. In mixed systems there 
may be three or even four major actors: the president, the prime minister, the 
minister for defence and the joint chief of staff of the armed forces. In this 
situation, he states: “The hierarchical line that is so central to military thinking 
acquires a new complexity” (ibid, p. 57). This complexity leaves room for 
“constitutional ambiguities regarding one of the central issues of many 
democracies: the subordination of the military to the democratically elected 
authorities and hopefully to civilian supremacy” (ibid, p. 59). 
In theory, then, the problem of a divided executive can occur not only 
during periods of cohabitation but in other situations as well. In his paper on 
France, Suleiman explains why: “The reason for this lies in the competitive 
element that the system introduces” (Suleiman, 1994, p. 158). For example, 
Protsyk has emphasised the potential for intra-executive conflict during coalition 
government. He says the “fact that the president and prime minister belong to 
the same majority coalition … does not serve as a sufficient condition for 
avoiding intraexecutive conflict” (Protsyk, 2005, p. 13). He continues: “… the 
incentives for president and prime minister to cooperate might be much less 
compelling when they are members of a highly factionalised party or of different 
parties that form a governing coalition than when they belong to the same 
organizationally disciplined and ideologically coherent political party” (ibid., pp. 
13-14). 
 There is a further scenario that renders a divided executive potentially 
problematic. In the literature on presidentialism, there is a concern that the direct 
election of the president encourages populist candidates (Linz, 1990, p. 61). Such 
candidates may try to appeal to the public over the head of political parties, thus 
bypassing traditional political channels. These candidates often style themselves 
as independent candidates or as candidates of the nation as a whole. Once 
elected, though, such presidents may be faced with a prime minister who has an 
explicit party affiliation and who promotes particular party interests. In this case, 
there is further potential for intra-executive conflict. It should be noted, though, 
that the same potential for conflict is unlikely to be present in the case where 
there is a party-affiliated president and a non-party prime minister as, invariably, 
non-party prime ministers are technocrats rather than populists. 
Thus, there are good theoretical reasons to suggest that a divided 
executive in a mixed system of government is problematic generally and that the 
problems are not confined to periods of cohabitation. In terms of empirical 
studies, there is some statistical evidence to support the theoretical arguments, 
but in general terms the literature tends to be impressionistic. For example, in her 
study of semi-presidential systems Moestrup (2004) warns against the adoption 
of this regime type.4 She finds that Linz’s worries “about the possibility of 
political stalemate during divided government are supported by the empirical 
                                                 
4 There is an ongoing debate about what constitutes a semi-presidential system 
(Siaroff, 2003). We sidestep this debate. We note, though, that there would be 
general agreement that all semi-presidential regimes come under our heading of 
a mixed system. There would not be general agreement that all countries under 
our heading of a mixed system are semi-presidential. 
evidence” (Moestrup, 2004, p. 222). On the basis of a statistical model, she 
concludes that semi-presidentialism “does not appear to be particularly well-
suited for young democracies” (ibid., p. 228). Similarly, Protsyk (2005) finds that 
there was a high level of intraexecutive conflict in Eastern European regimes 
from 1991-2002. He writes: “… intraexecutive conflict was usually initiated by 
presidents who challenged the prime minister’s leadership over cabinet” (ibid., 
p. 19). In terms of case studies, recent events in Timor-Leste suggest that a 
divided executive was at least part of the cause of the country’s recent 
difficulties. In June 2006, President Gusmão threatened to resign unless Prime 
Minister Alkatiri stepped down.5 Indeed, the Timor-Leste case is particularly 
interesting because President Gusmão is a non-party figure, whereas Prime 
Minister Alkatiri represented the Fretilin party that had a large majority in the 
legislature. This situation was similar to the one in Poland during the Wałęsa 
presidency and, for Linz and Stepan (1996), this period was particularly difficult 
for the country: “Because of party fragmentation and its dualistic deadlock, 
Poland’s efforts to advance toward a balanced budget and a mixed economy 
stalled” (ibid., p. 282). Overall, what empirical evidence there is seems to support 
the theoretical claims that a divided executive is damaging in mixed systems of 
government. In the rest of this paper, we test this standard wisdom. 
 
                                                 
5 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5105590.stm 
Sample, hypotheses, variables and model specification 
 
In this article we examine the effect of a divided executive on democratisation. 
Our sample is mixed systems of government, i.e. systems where the 
constititution allows for both a directly elected president and a prime minister 
who is responsible to the legislature. There are currently 54 mixed systems in the 
world. (See Figure 2). In addition, other countries have had mixed systems in the 
past but have since abandoned them. For example, there was a mixed system in 
in Burundi from 1992-96, in the Comoros from 1979-85 and from 1992-2000, in 
Congo-Brazzaville from 1992-97, and in Moldova from 1991-2000. We include 
these countries in our sample. 
 Figure 2 about here. 
This sample allows us to test for the effect of divided government because 
it keeps constant the basic institutional architecture of countries, yet at the same 
time it allows for variation among the set of countries within the sample. For the 
purposes of this article, a key feature of the sample is that it includes countries 
with one dominant actor within the executive as well as countries where the 
president and prime minister share powers. The sample includes 
“hyperpresidential” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 102) countries like Georgia where the 
president is far and away the most powerful political figure in the executive. It 
also includes countries such as Slovenia where there is a figurehead president 
and where the prime minister controls the executive. In both types of situations, 
we hypothesise that a divided executive is unlikely to have a significant effect on 
the process of democratisation because the dominant political actor will continue 
to control the decision-making process and because there is little potential for 
intra-executive conflict. In addition, the sample also includes countries with a 
dual executive like Niger where both the president and the prime minister enjoy 
significant political powers. In these countries, the potential for intra-executive 
conflict is greatest. Therefore, we hypothesise that a divided executive is likely to 
have a negative impact on democratisation when it occurs in countries where 
both the president and prime minister exercise significant political powers. 
We distinguish between three types of countries in our sample of mixed 
systems of government. We identify presidential-like countries where the 
president dominates the executive and where the prime minister merely 
implements the president’s decisions. We identify parliamentary-like countries 
where the president is directly elected but where the prime minister dominates 
the executive and where the president is merely a figurehead. We also identify 
dual executives where both the directly elected president and the prime minister 
share powers. We do not imply that there is an exact balance of power in 
countries with a dual executive, but both actors must have at least some 
significant independent powers of their own. 
When classifying countries we rely primarily on the constitutional 
situation. (See Figure 3 for a list of classifications.) We examine the constitution 
identifying whether the president or prime minister has overwhelming 
responsibility for political decision making, or whether there is some degree of 
authority. We focus on standard issues such as the appointment of ministers and 
public officials, powers over the assembly, decree and emergency powers, 
reserved policy domains and so on. To the extent that we are only trying to 
distinguish between three basic varieties of mixed systems, we do not need to 
code constitutions or provide scores for presidential and prime ministerial 
powers. We just need to identify basic authority relations. That said, we realise 
that constitutions can sometimes be unreliable power maps. Therefore, we use 
secondary literature to validate whether or not the constitution provides a 
basically accurate picture of the actual practice of political power. If it does not, 
then we classify a country on the basis of the actual power relations rather than 
the constitutional situation. This point applies to Austria and Iceland. We classify 
these countries as parliamentary-like, even though their constitutions give 
significant powers to the president. In both cases, the president’s powers have 
become defunct and political authority rests solely with the head of government 
(Sartori, 1997, p. 126). For example, Muller (1999, p. 22) states that “Austria is 
generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists” and 
that these authors “by an large echo what specialists on Austrian politics have 
observed since long ago” (ibid). Talking about the president of Iceland, 
Kristinsson (1999, p. 86) notes: 
The office was created with the establishment of a republic in 1944 
to take over the functions of the Danish monarch, which were 
largely ceremonial by that time. Many of the articles in the 
constitution dealing with the presidency are in fact transcribed 
from the constitution of 1918, when Iceland was still a kingdom, 
modelled on earlier Icelandic and Danish constitutions. Hence, it is 
customary in Iceland to regard the form of government as a 
parliamentary one, essentially similar to the Danish one, despite the 
different ways heads of state come into office.  
We are confident that the classification of countries in Figure 3 matches the 
standard judgement of comparativists and country experts.6 
 Figure 3 about here. 
 Having identified the different types of mixed systems, we define a 
divided executive as the situation where the president and prime minister are 
from different political forces. In our sample, we identify three types of divided 
executives in mixed systems. We identify the situation where the president and 
                                                 
6 We checked our classifications in Figure 3 against equivalent classifications of 
mixed regimes by Siaroff (2003, pp. 299-300) – his category 5 – and classifications 
of presidential and mixed regimes by Cheibub (2002, pp. 137-138). There is a very 
high degree of overlap between three classifications. That said, it should be noted 
that no two sets of classifications will be exactly the same due to the subjective 
nature of the exercise. For example, there are differences between Siaroff and 
Cheibub’s classification. Moreover, it should be remembered that both Siaroff 
and Cheibub classify regimes on the basis of presidential powers, whereas we are 
concerned with both presidential and prime ministerial powers. 
prime minister are from opposing political parties.7 This corresponds to classic 
French-style cohabitation between political enemies where the potential for intra-
executive conflict is high. We also identify the situation where the president and 
prime minister are from opposing political parties, even if these parties are part 
of a broad governing alliance or coalition. We call this intra-coalition conflict. In 
these cases, even though the president and prime minister may have, or have 
had, a common purpose, they may also have diverging party interests that can be 
the source of tension and intra-executive conflict. Finally, we identify the 
situation where there is a non-party president but where the prime minister is a 
member of a political party. As outlined above, if such presidents are faced with 
a prime minister who has an explicit party affiliation and who promotes 
particular party interests, then there is further potential for intra-executive 
conflict.  Our measures are cumulative.  Thus, the variable called “intra-
coalition” includes cohabitation as well as presidents and prime ministers from 
different parties within a governing coalition.  The “non-party president” 
variable includes cases of cohabitation and intra-coalition divided executives as 
well as non-party presidents. 
 To test for the effect of a divided executive on democratisation in the 
different types of countries in our sample, we use Freedom House’s classification 
                                                 
7 We rely on the affiliations given in www.worldstatesmen.org/. We then use 
secondary sources to confirm whether or not examples of a divided executive are 
cases of cohabitation. 
of countries as Free, Partly Free and Not Free as our dependent variable. We 
begin in 1976, when Freedom House had just begun to classify countries in this 
way. From that time, we take the annual rating of each country as noted in the 
Freedom House 2005 survey (Freedom House, 2005). As noted above, the 
standard wisdom is that newly-democratising countries should avoid mixed 
systems because of the potential for intra-executive conflict inherent in them. The 
literature assumes that institutional effects of this sort only ‘kick in’ when the 
process of democratisation has begun. Thus, we include countries in our sample 
only when they have a system where there is both a directly elected president 
and a prime minister responsible to the legislature and when the country is first 
classed as Partly Free or Free by Freedom House. This means we exclude from 
our analysis countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Egypt because these 
countries have always been classified as Not Free, even though for some or all of 
the 1975-2004 period constitutionally these countries have had a mixed system of 
government. Equally, we only include a country like Mauritania from 2001 when 
it was first classed as Partly Free, even though it adopted a mixed system in 1991 
when it was still classed as Not Free. We treat the tripartite Freedom House 
classification as an ordinal variable. We expect lower values of the dependent 
variable when there is a divided executive in a dual system than when there is a 
divided executive in a parliamentary-like or presidential-like system. 
We control for a standard set of factors that are highlighted in the 
democratisation literature.8 We control for GDP per capita, expressed in terms of 
Purchasing Power Parity (in constant 2000 international $). We also control for 
GDP growth (annual % change). We lag the growth figure by a year. We use the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators as the source of all our economic 
data. (For a full list of countries and years in our sample, see Figure 3). In 
addition, we include legislative fractionalisation as measured by the 2004 version 
of the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. This is Rae’s 
fractionalisation index, which equals one if every legislator is a member of a 
different party and zero if all legislators are the members of the same party.  We 
specify this variable quadratically. On the one hand, very low legislative 
fractionalisation is bad for democracy because it reduces the legislature’s ability 
to act as a check on the executive and indicates a low level of electoral 
competition. On the other hand, very high frationalisation reduces the 
probability of both an effective legislature and effective cabinet government. 
Finally, we control for the prior presence of consolidated democracy. We assume 
that if a country chooses a mixed system when democracy is already the only 
game in town, then we would expect the system to remain democratic whether 
or not there is a divided executive and whatever type of mixed system is in place. 
Using Freedom House scores, we take the Free classification to be a proxy for the 
                                                 
8 See Przeworski, et al (2000). 
presence of consolidated democracy. So, for example, Mongolia adopted a mixed 
system of government in 1992 when it was already rated as Free by Freedom 
House. Missing data leaves us with 638 observations. We use an ordinal logit 
model to test our hypotheses. 
 
Results 
 
The three types of divided executives identify impressively different numbers of 
observations. (See Table 1). There are almost fifty per cent more observations of 
intra-coalition division within the executive than there are of cohabitation, while 
there are over fifty per cent more cases of non-party presidents governing with 
party prime ministers than there are of cohabitation and intra-coalition division 
of the executive combined. According to the Mann-Whitney test, each of the 
three measures is strongly associated with the Freedom House classification. This 
represents a good start for the theory, but, of course, it has to survive the 
inclusion of controls. 
 Table 1 about here. 
We hypothesise that in mixed systems a divided executive will have a 
different impact on the process of democratization under different institutional 
situations. Specifically, we hypothesise that the impact will be more negative 
when there is a dual executive than when there is either a parliamentary-like or a 
presidential-like executive. Table 2 illustrates that divided executives are 
extremely rare in presidential-like mixed systems. The only example of 
cohabitation in a presidential-like mixed system was in the Central African 
Republic in 1996. In addition, three further presidential-like observations have 
had presidents and prime ministers from different parties: the Central African 
Republic in 1993, Comoros in 1992 and Senegal in 2000. There are ten years of 
observations of non-party presidents governing with party prime ministers in 
presidential-like mixed systems. If cohabitation and/or intra-coalition division of 
the executive are problems for democratization, they can only be substantially so 
in mixed and parliamentary-like mixed systems. 
Table 2 about here. 
We proceed by presenting three ordinal logit models in which we predict 
Freedom House classification using all of our controls and our three measures of 
divided executives in turn. We excluded the single observation of cohabitation in 
a presidential-like mixed system, as we did the three further observations of 
presidents and prime ministers from different coalition parties in a presidential-
like mixed system. In these two models, there is only one interaction term for 
divided executives. These four cases and the ten cases of non-party presidents 
and party prime ministers in presidential-like mixed systems have been included 
in the last equation. Therefore, in this model, divided executives are interacted 
with both mixed and parliamentary-like mixed systems. (See Table 3). 
Table 3 about here. 
All of the coefficients for the control variables are in the right direction 
and in most cases they are also statistically significant. The exceptions are lagged 
growth, which is never significant, and the parliamentary-like type, which is 
only significant in the cohabitation model. The coefficient for the interaction of 
cohabitation and dual executive systems is negative, as the theory would predict, 
but it does not approach statistical significance.9 Executives divided between 
presidents and prime ministers from different cabinet parties perform similarly. 
The coefficient for non-party presidents and party prime ministers is positive, 
which is the opposite of what the literature would predict. These results were 
unaffected by the exclusion of any of the states in the sample.10 
                                                 
9 Obviously, the interaction of two categorical variables (sub-regime type and 
divided executive) introduces multicollinearity and the possibility of inflated 
standard errors.  However, there are reasons to believe that the insignificance of 
the divided executive variables is not due to multicollinearity.  First, in simple 
equations, containing the collinear variables themselves, but not the vital regime 
and legislative fractionalization controls, the variables are significant.  So, the 
interaction terms in themselves do not preclude a statistically significant result.  
Second, the equations presented above do not exhibit the characteristically very 
large coefficients and standard errors of very severe multicollinearity.  
10 Excluding Macedonia from the cohabitation or intra-coalition models 
precluded convergence.  In the non-party president model the value of the 
dependent variable was completely determined for the parliamentary-like states.  
Macedonia is the only case of a parliamentary-like state which has at any stage 
been Partly Free, rather than Free. 
In sum, our data from a near 30-year period and 47 states around the 
world reproduces the robust results of other studies in terms of the effect of 
wealth, consolidation and legislative fractionalisation. However, it does not 
provide statistically significant results for the effect of any of our three measures 
of a divided executive. Therefore, we conclude the theory that divided executives 
undermine democracy is unproven. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There exists a powerful consensus on the negative effects of divided executives 
in mixed systems, so powerful that constitution writers in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere have revised initial plans for introducing such systems. This 
consensus is based on a theory with a clear and powerful logic, but only 
impressionistic evidence, lacking in generality, quantification and controls. Our 
systematic study questions the consensus about the negative effects of divided 
executives. This is not to question the argument that divided executives produce 
conflict, or that this conflict can and does have negative consequences. However, 
divided executives in mixed systems where both the president and the prime 
minister have significant independent powers have not generally had such a 
profound effect on the political system that they are associated with a 
downgrade of Freedom House classification. It is worth noting that there is no 
shortage of qualitative evidence consistent with our quantitative findings.  
Indeed, Poland, a case used by Linz and Stepan to launch an influential 
campaign against mixed systems, is perfectly consistent with our conclusion. 
There was a period of intense inter-institutional conflict but this had no effect on 
overall democracy ratings. Political engineers have no general empirical basis on 
which to recommend against the adoption of a mixed system of government 
with a dual executive on the basis these countries may experience divisive intra-
executive conflict that will be more likely to have a negative effect on the process 
of democratisation. 
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Figure 2 
Mixed systems of government, 2006 
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Figure 3 
Dataset and type of mixed system 
 
State Years in Dataset Type of mixed system 
Algeria 1989-91 Presidential-like 
Angola 1991-92 Presidential-like 
Armenia 1992-2004 Presidential-like 
Austria 1976-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Azerbaijan 1998-2003 Presidential-like 
Belarus 1994-96 Presidential-like 
Bulgaria 1994-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Burkina Faso 1978-79; 1993-2004 Presidential-like 
Cape Verde 1990-2004 Dual executive 
Central African Republic 1991-2003 Presidential-like 
Comoros 1982-84; 92-99 Presidential-like 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1992-97 Dual executive 
Croatia 1993-2004 1991-2000 Presidential-like 
2001-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Finland 1976-2004 1976-2000 Dual executive  
2001-2004 Parliamentary-like 
France 1976-2004 Dual executive 
Georgia 2004 Presidential-like 
Guinea-Bissau 1991-2004 Presidential-like 
Haiti 1994-2000 Dual executive 
Iceland 1976-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Ireland 1976-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Kazakhstan 1992-94 Presidential-like 
Lithuania 1993-2003 Dual executive 
Macedonia 1992-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Madagascar 1978-2004 1978-91 Presidential-like 
1992-95 Dual executive 
1996-2004 Presidential-like 
Mali 1993-2002 Presidential-like 
Mauritania 2001-2003 Presidential-like 
Moldova 1992-2000 Dual executive 
Mongolia 1992-2004 Dual executive 
Mozambique 1991-2004 Presidential-like 
Namibia 1991-2004 Presidential-like 
Niger 1991-95, 1999-2004 Dual executive 
Peru 1989-2004 Presidential-like 
Poland 1992-2004 Dual executive 
Portugal 1977-2004 1977-79 Dual executive 
1980-2004 Parliamentary-like 
Romania 1991-2004 Dual executive 
Russia 1994-2004 Presidential-like 
Senegal 1991-04 Presidential-like 
Singapore 1991-04 Presidential-like 
Slovakia 1999-04 Parliamentary-like 
Slovenia 1992-04 Parliamentary-like 
South Korea 1988-2004 Presidential-like 
Sri Lanka 1978-04 Dual executive 
Tanzania 1992-04 Presidential-like 
Togo 1999-02 Presidential-like 
Tunisia 1978-98 Presidential-like 
Ukraine 1992-04 1992-94 Dual executive  
1995-2004 Presidential-like 
Notes: If a country moved to Not Free, the first year of this status is included in 
the period above.  Due to missing data, the above list of states and periods, does 
not cover all years in all states, during which there was a mixed system and a 
Free or Partly Free regime. 
 
Table 1 
Divided Executives and Freedom House Classification 
 
Cohabitation Intra-Coalition 
Non-party 
president  
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Move to 
Not Free 
1 15 1 15 1 15 16 
Partly Free 7 292 22 277 45 254 299 
Free 66 257 107 216 150 173 323 
Total 74 564 128 510 196 442 638 
Mann-
Whitney z 
-6.899 -8.014 -8.720 
P > |z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Regime Types and Divided Executives 
 
Cohabitation Intra-Coalition 
Non-party 
president 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Presidential-
like 
1 226 4 223 14 213 227 
Mixed 35 215 61 189 78 172 250 
Parliamentary-
like 
38 123 65 96 57 104 161 
Total 74 564 130 508 196 442 638 
 
 
Table 3 
Ordinal Logit Regressions of Freedom House Classification 
 
 Cohabitation Intra-coalition 
Non-party 
president 
Wealth - lagged 
0.0001908 
(0.0000298)*** 
0.0001933 
(0.0000308)**** 
0.0001938 
(0.0000308)*** 
Growth - lagged 
0.0308722 
(0.0216567) 
0.0314674 
(0.0217369) 
0.0341534 
(0.0216616) 
Consolidation at entry 
3.201036 
(0.3273276)*** 
3.207089 
(0.3226089)*** 
3.218591 
(0.3173707)*** 
Parliamentary-like 
1.067567 
(0.5631595)* 
1.031986* 
(0.5727557) 
1.397577 
(0.7289098)* 
Dual Executive 
1.170248 
(0.3310134)*** 
1.181543 
(0.3341219)*** 
1.048797 
(0.3485256)** 
Divided Executive 
1.079554 
(1.270118) 
1.364085 
(1.233929) 
0.2340413 
(0.8682075) 
Parliamentary-
like*Divided Executive 
- - 
-0.2474821 
(1.210641) 
Dual*Divided Executive 
-1.020777 
(1.438037) 
-1.357226 
(1.350723) 
0.5124723 
(0.963636) 
Legislative 
fractionalization 
5.844381 
(1.981056)** 
6.066345 
(1.994909)** 
6.521812 
(2.041027)** 
Legislative 
fractionalization² 
-4.959888 
(2.288742)* 
-5.212217 
(2.306764)* 
-5.971844 
(2.39632)* 
Cut 1 
-1.097183 
(0.3511957) 
-0.9648077 
(0.3636157) 
-0.9951173 
(0.3649586) 
Cut 2 
5.047628 
(0.5121674) 
5.127559 
(0.5277795) 
5.157451 
(0.5329739) 
States 47 47 47 
Observations 637 634 638 
Log Likelihood -212.18822 -211.19624 -211.01071 
Prob > LR chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden Pseudo R² 0.5796 0.5801 0.582 
Notes: For each coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p< 
0.01; *** p< 0.001.  
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